City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations and Theses

City College of New York

2019

The Importance of Property Rights In The Developing World: A
study and comparison of Zimbabwe and Botswana
Luke A. Scarpa
CUNY City College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/802
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

The Importance of Property Rights In The Developing World: A study and comparison
of Zimbabwe and Botswana

Luke Scarpa

April 2019

Master’s Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of
International
Affairs at the City College of New York

COLIN POWELL SCHOOL FOR CIVIC AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

Advisor:Professor Nicholas Smith
Second Reader: Professor Jean Krasno

1

Table of Contents
 age
P
Abstract………………………………………………..3
Intro…………………………………………………....4
Literature Review……………………………………..5
Argument……………………………………………...11
Research & Design…………………………………....14
Case Study: Zimbabwe………………………………..16
Case Study: Botswana………………………………….29
Conclusion……………………………………………...39

2

Abstract
African states in the post-colonial era have undergone notably different rates of
economic growth and development. I argue that creating a strong legal framework to
prevent state over-interference in private property is one of the most important public
policy initiatives African states that have seen high levels of growth have taken. I’ve
come to this conclusion by studying and reviewing relevant economic and historical
literature about the relationship between economic growth and strong property rights
regimes and property rights in Africa since the end of colonialism. I have centered my
study around Zimbabwe and Botswana because those states have implemented and
articulated opposing positions regarding property rights, which make them valuable
states to study in great detail. From this analysis, I’ve concluded that the Botswana
government has historically exhibited a distinct legal policy position regarding private
ownership of property. This position has created a series of outcomes which has been
largely responsible for the high level of economic prosperity Botswana has experienced
since its independence in nineteen sixty-six. The Zimbabwean government has
articulated a distinctly different position on the value of securing private property, and
this has led it to a series of public policy initiatives regarding private property very
different than the private property regime established in Botswana. This analysis helps
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establish a future framework useful for governments in establishing economies looking
to develop, and a historical way of judging the utility of large scale redistributions of
private property. I look for this analysis to help establish a more useful form of analysis
and rhetoric.

Intro
In the post-imperial era, African states developed economically in profoundly
different ways. A thread woven into all their post-colonial struggles, however, is how to
deal with past injustices, particularly the imperialist exploitation of land appropriated
from Africans. When colonialism ended, post-colonial African states were left with
high levels of poverty, extreme land and wealth inequality benefitting the descendants
of their white European settlers, and authoritarian and repressive political structures
influenced by colonial institutions. Modern African states dealt with their colonial
legacies by pursuing radically different development policies and engaging in different
kinds of political rhetoric regarding the pace of reform or colonial injustices.
Much persuasive evidence suggests that African countries which pursued
political reform to what they viewed as the lingering effects of colonialism in a gradual
manner, and relatedly and crucially enforced strict protections of property rights, saw
relatively successful political and economic development. In contrast,
countries which made rapid attempts at correcting colonial injustices and
did not protect property rights experienced significant development issues. Why have
4

strong property rights protections had such positive results, and why have certain
African countries undermined property rights in attempting to solve the economic
issues created by imperialism? If property rights are so important for enabling
economic prosperity, why have some governments undermined property rights?
To answer these questions, I examine the cases of Botswana and Zimbabwe respectively, a country that has consistently grown its economy since the end of
colonialism and a country that saw initial economic promise follow colonialism fall
apart.In examining the two cases, I find that economic divergences like these cannot
be explained by one factor. Rather, they must be understood by understanding certain
elements such as ideas, histories of individuals, elements of international economics,
and great power politics. I argue that these elements pushed Botswana and Zimbabwe
onto the development paths which they followed, and understanding the divergence
between Botswana and Zimbabwe is valuable to understanding patterns of
international development generally.
Literature Review
Individual leaders, especially in developing states, play a critical role in the
formative economic policies of those states. In the post-independence period African
states were often led by revolutionaries who were formed intellectually by a struggle
against European powers, while others were led by pragmatists whose motivations
5

were distinctly non-revolutionary. In Botswana and Zimbabwe, founding leaders
Seretse Khama and Robert Mugabe fit this dual paradigm, but each man is a broader
example of a specific type of leadership character. They shall be studied by
examining literature relating to the role of leadership in developing states.
The temperament of the leaders in post-independence developing states is
critical. Their rhetoric plays an important role in helping their states create a political
culture and political tradition. I argue that Seretse Khama and the Botswanan tribal
leadership, out of which he emerged, is characteristic of the sort of political
leadership capable of protecting property rights and, therefore, sustained economic
development. I also argue that Robert Mugabe’s political character, much of which
was formed during a brutal war with a colonial occupying power, is representative of
the sort of political leadership which rejects gradualist post-colonial political
development and the concept of property rights, and partially from this does not see
sustained development.
As exemplars of revolutionary and pragmatic leadership, Mugabe and Khama,
help illustrate the importance of leadership for postcolonial development. Yet, they
also show that the choices they made as leaders must be understood in historical
context. Examining their choices has the additional advantage of shedding light on
two of the key theories used to explain divergent developmental paths: Modernization
Theory and Dependency Theory. Modernization Theory is essential to understanding
6

property rights because it emphasizes the power of gradual development. In
Modernization Theory developing nations are in many ways similar to developed
nations. The major difference is that developing nations haven’t had as much time to
develop because they are often newly independent following their years of imperialist
control. If Western levels of development are achievable for all countries,
under the modernization paradigm Western methods and, more importantly in this
frame of thought Western models of development should be practiced by developing
countries.
In contrast to modernization theories, dependency theory leads to an entirely
different set of assumptions, some of which might lead to a different perspective of
property rights in development. Scholars of Dependency Theory such as Leslie Stein
argue that the Global South is structurally imbalanced in its relationship with the
Global North1. She persuasively argues that conventional economists have neglected
the influence of dependence of weak states on strong states which has a deep
influence in the form of the international economy. This assumption reasonably leads
to the notion that these imbalances prevent Western policies for development from
working in the global South. The underdevelopment which leads to a system of

"Dependency Theories and Underdevelopment", Journal of Economic Studies, 1979, Vol. 6 Issue: 1,
pp.64-85.
1
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dependency has been explored in the work of Andre Gunder Frank2. Frank argues that
the economic logic of the Western development model is pointless in the development
of the global South because developed countries maintain a mercantile-like
relationship with the global South which is inherent to the disparate amount of power
the developed world holds over it in international politics. This neo-mercantilist
relationship hinders market oriented development in the developing world, and requires
action and acknowledgement from the international community to be resolved.
No theory is a perfect representation of the complexity of human
circumstance, but I find these theories crucial to my argument. Although I find
property rights protection to be successful to economic development, dependency
theory offers a compelling logic that old Eurocentric systems and arguments for
property rights are unjust and hypocritical. The non-gradualist is compelling and often
humane. All theories of development, however, look to help African countries build
successful public institutions. The World Bank has been mocked by some for calling
on countries to “add institutions and stir3,” as economist Deirdre Mccloskey says. But
without acknowledging the importance of public institutions all development theories
lose coherence. This is important to understand in the context of Africa. I argue that
institutions in all of post-independence Africa were created abruptly. Therefore, they
did not have long periods of development as institutions in countries in the West did,
2
3

Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment (New England Free Press: 1966)
Deirdre Mccloskely, Bourgeois Equality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 224
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institutions which had the liberty of a long period of trial and error. African countries
becoming independent nation states in the 1960’s needed institutions crafted rapidly
to meet the needs of the twentieth century economy, and the urgency of this process
made African public institutions crucial to their countries development paths.
Much has been written about the evolution and failure of African institutions
such as courts, elections, and state economic agencies, but not all African countries
have seen their institutions breakdown. The question, which is inadequately answered
in the existing literature, is why certain African countries have developed
institutions so much more successfully than others. I argue that Botswana’s property
rights protections are a product of its colonial institutions which evolved
during a period when Britain governed under a policy similar to
general neglect4. Zimbabwe’s institutional development was profoundly different than
Botswana’s. Many of its institutions are alien to its indigenous culture. Some are even
the direct legacy of colonial authoritarianism.
The legacy of colonialism in Africa cannot be broken purely into the logic of
institutions and resources extracted. The nature of the colonial state is beyond
something that can be viewed through a pure sort of cost benefit analysis. The states
themselves had a fundamental character. The Rhodesian leadership was

4
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quasi-totalitarian and deeply racist. It broke from the British government because of
its extremity, and viewed itself as a bulwark as what it saw as barbarism. This
totalitarian culture political did not die when Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith gave
control of the government to Robert Mugabe. Mugabe and Smith are different
men. Mugabe did not model himself after Smith but the ramifications of decades of
quasi-totalitarian political cultural in Rhodesia for postcolonial politics must be
explored. This political climate created the struggle in which modern Zimbabwe was
founded and the nature of it is linked to Zimbabwe’s modern political culture.
The territory of Botswana was governed more liberally by the British government as
its tribal leadership cunningly avoided domination by the ruthless British diamond
magnate Cecil Rhodes. The differing relationships between the colonial regime and
the local population in each case, I argue, has had long-term impact on property rights
in each instance and how that impacted economic development in each country.
Property Rights regimes in Africa are not created by one factor. They are
influenced and created by many elements. Policy is important, but policy would
be meaningless without distinct leaders, countries’ political cultures, international
economics, and history. Thus, I argue, each of these factors have played a role in
forming the property rights regimes of modern African states. These factors should
not be viewed hierarchically. They are independently important in different ways.
certain mixes create property rights regimes and others lead to regimes attacking
10

property rights. This begs a prior question, though: why are property rights
important? I turn to that question in the next section.
Argument
Property rights have a simple definition. Property
rights, economist Armen Alchian said, are “a method of assigning to particular
individuals the ‘authority’ to select, for specific goods, any use from a nonprohibited
class of uses.”5 As suggested in the preceding remarks the concepts of
“authority” and of “nonprohibited” rely on some concept of enforcement or inducement
to respect the assignment and scope of prohibited choice. I define property rights in
my argument as protection against other people’s choosing how to use resources
owned by another.
States securing property rights, in all sorts of structurally varying
economies, helps create economic growth. Why is this so? According to the
economist Ronald Coase, in his seminal theory of property rights, where there is a
conflict of property rights, parties can bargain or negotiate terms that are
more beneficial to both parties than the outcome of any assigned property rights6.

Gerald P. O Driscoll, Jr, “Economic Freedom: The Path to Development.” Foundation For Economic
Freedom, April 1, 2005.
6
Coase Theorem,Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1-6.2016.Springer New York
5
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This essentially means that individuals can come to agreements about best use of
their property on their own more efficiently than any outside institution can. The logic
and theories behind the importance of property rights all rest upon the same principle.
Individuals use resources they’ve cultivated themselves with more care than those
who have no relationship to them. This principle applies to the developing world as it
does to the developed. Capital, as much as it can vary from agricultural economies to
industrial ones, is taken better care of by those who depend on its uses than a third
party without the same level of interest in the capital. People care about and
understand the strengths and deficiencies of their own property. This idea is an
assumption about human psychology which is universal. It would apply to all
individuals and all sorts of non-financial capital which they might utilize.
These theoretical assumptions often bear out empirically. For example,
countries with strong property rights on average are significantly wealthier than
countries with weak property rights. In 2003, the GDP per capita in countries with
strong property rights was twice that of countries with weak property rights. The
International Property Rights Index each year ranks every country in the world by their
commitment to property rights. The countries with the ten highest rankings all have
GDPs Per Capita above $40,000 which puts them among the richest countries in the
world.7 To be sure, correlation is not causation. Finland and Singapore, are not rich
International Property Rights Index, International Property Rights Index 2017. Accessed February 28,
2018. https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/countries,
7
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only because their governments gave their citizens authority to use specific goods
and neither is Botswana. Yet, I argue that the correlation between property rights and
economic growth is large enough to suggest that they do contribute to
growth. Property rights in many African countries, to the limited extent that they’ve
been enforced, show a relationship with successful economic policy similar to the one
found in the rest of the world. For instance, Rwanda has the 33rd most secure
property rights (According to the International Property Rights Index) in the world and
is growing at a rate of 7.18% per year. Botswana has the 44th most secure property
rights in the world and has grown at extraordinary rate for decades since
independence.
Given its history with colonialism, however, property rights on the African
continent have often had a more complicated history than property rights protections
in the European countries from which the original economic models were developed.
Throughout African history arguments for property rights have been hypocritically
used by colonialists who deprived native Africans of their property. Wealthy white
settlers came upon their property through expropriation with little if any recompense
and they justified the inequality this expropriation created using the arguments for
property rights. This injustice is historical fact, and it is a dilemma for any proponent
of property rights. How can a government not take action to quickly remedy an
13

injustice perpetrated against its people? Property rights as a concept do not argue
against the justice of this sentiment. The logic for them does not even necessarily
call for a fair-minded and justice-centered redistribution of property but all attempts, if
they are to be done, call for gradualism. This is the key to property oriented gradualist
development. My research and exploration of my test countries examines historical
examples of developing-world property decisions and give clarity to how they came to
be.
If the empirical evidence for property rights is solid and difficult to take issue
with, why would a state consciously undermine them? This is the heart of my
question. There are two obvious reasons which are well connected to each other.
The first is to gain moral support by appearing to promote fairness. This might be
done to resolve the perceived cruelties of the past. The second is to create a certain
sort of efficiency. In the opinions of post colonial governments, land inequities might
be bad for their current economies and a more equal distribution of land might make
more of their people successful which would improve the efficiency of their economies
as whole entities. Developing countries want to prove that their solving past injustices
while benefiting their countries economies in the future. I argue that these motives are
evident in my case studies, but they were overcome by the economic argument for
property rights.
Research Design
14

I explore why some governments in former British colonies protected property
rights and why some have not through the cases of Botswana and Zimbabwe. These
countries have gone through periods of development which will illustrate the benefits
of protecting property rights and the costs of sabotaging them. Botswana and
Zimbabwe have seen drastically different levels of post independence economic
development, which would have been hard to foresee from analyzing their material
conditions when each country reached independence. Since independence, Botswana
has had one of the highest rates of economic growth in the world averaging about 9%
growth from 1966 to 1999.8 This growth started immediately after its independence. In
1960, while Botswana was still part of the British Empire, its GDP per capita was
about $60 making it one of the poorest countries in the world.9 Twenty-six years later,
in 1986, its GDP per capita was about $1,200 which represents a 2,000 percent
increase.10 This is a remarkable trend and one of the greatest short term periods of
economic success in human history. Botswana is vital to this analysis because its
sustained economic growth started almost immediately at its independence. In 1966,
at its independence, Botswana’s GDP per capita was $80 and in 1976, ten years after
its independence, it was $50011.

8

“Botswana GDP,” Trading Economics, Accessed March 24, 2018.
https://tradingeconomics.com/botswana/gdp.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
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Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita rose from 1966 to 1976 as well, from $297 to to
$543. But in the ten years after its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita
actually shrank by about fifty percent, and is today the same as what it was in 1980.12
The difference between Botswana and Zimbabwe is stark.The effects of these
divergent post-independence paths are even clearer when viewed through the
Botswanan and Zimbabwean labor forces. Unemployment in Botswana is consistently
under 20%, which is one of the lowest in Africa.13 Thirty years ago Botswana’s
illiteracy rate was over seventy percent and now it has the fourth highest literacy rate
in Africa.14 Zimbabwe failing in essentially every metric which measures public
wellbeing. The human cost of this is intense.
How can this difference be explained? I argue in the remainder of the thesis
that Botswana’s respect for property rights in its development played a major role in
its economic success. By contrast, the failure of Zimbabwe’s ruling party to protect
property rights and its ideological attack on them as a concept has been a driving
reason for its failure to see any real sustained economic growth. We shall see this
divergence in the cases that follow.

12

“Zimbabwe GDP” Trading Economics. Accessed March 28, 2018.
https://tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/gdp
13
14

“The Ten Most Illiterate Countries in Africa.” World Atlas. Accessed April 2, 2018.
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-10-most-literate-countries-of-africa.html
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Case Study Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe was formed by exploitative and nationalistic elements within
British society and a deep understanding of those elements is necessary to
understand the way independent Zimbabwe treated property rights. However, there
is no single reason for why Zimbabwe pushed the sort of property rights regime it
Did. Rather, a multifaceted account of the actions of the actors that created its early
politics is necessary for understanding why the post-colonial regime ultimately chose
to violate the country’s property rights regime.
The necessary place to start this exploration is with Cecil Rhodes, one
of the most influential capitalists in the history of the British Empire. Cecil Rhodes
was hugely important to the development of the western world. He was a British
diamond magnate crucial to the founding of Zimbabwe. An influential British editor
met him in 1892 and characterized him in a telling way. “Size was the first external
impression you received of him. There was something in his rather leonine head and
massive loose pose which raised him to heroic proportions.”15 Although admired by
this particular reporter, Rhodes isn’t typically described in admiring terms today. He
was a ruthless in his practices and his accumulation of power. However, his
importance to history cannot be ignored.
15

The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and The Pursuit of Power by Robert I. Rotberg. 1988. Oxford Press, 4.
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Cecil Rhodes formed Rhodesia, contemporary Zimbabwe’s predecessor, in a
rush for gold, which was found in its southern Matabeland. The Matabeland chief
Lobelunga was a valuable asset for Rhodes to influence. Similar to Belgium’s use of
the Congo as a corporate enterprise, Cecil Rhodes’ new territory was technically
beholden to the British government, which halfheartedly attempted to govern its
imperial properties under a set of standards which they tried to enforce on Rhodes’
settlers. The British administration of Matabeland was supposed to offer some benefit
to its Natives. Yet, despite Rhodesia’s value to the Crown, the British government’s
standards of governance were poor. It could call for the humane governance of a
corporate territory but it couldn’t enforce its declared principles. Perhaps most
importantly, the settlers attacked the Matabeland tribal government, setting an early
division among settlers and indigenous groups over land.16 This was the beginning of
a striking pattern similar to Robert Mugabe’s nationalistic form of governance nearly a
century later. Thus, modern Zimbabwe was formed in a series of conflicts.
The next conflict to control Rhodesia was between Cecil Rhodes’ company
and the settlers inhabiting it. “For several decades after the occupation of
Mashonaland and Matabeland, members of the settler bourgeoisie were clearer about
what they were not than what they were. They claimed they were neither slaves of the
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chartered company or passing adventurers.17” The British government thought they
could regulate the actions of Cecil Rhodes, and Rhodes thought he had could control
the passions of his own employees. Neither notion was entirely true. Thousands of
miles from London the political passions of a group of settlers overcame Rhodes’s
interests in large part because of the value of Rhodesian land. The settlers followed a
form of nationalism of a nation that they created. They saw themselves as the rightful
settlers of an independent nation, despite their interference in the property of the
indigenous Africans.

British control through Rhodesia’s charter was legally strong. The British
government gave itself a veto over all of Cecil Rhodes’ actions. His corporate state was
under political control, which theoretically offered some protections to the local African
population, but Cecil Rhodes died at the age of forty nine. Skeptical of the British
government, Rhodesian settlers took governance into their own hands. Since
Rhodesian settlers interfered with the initial agreement Rhodes made with the
Matabeland tribal leaders, they’d created a legislative council and twenty years after
Rhodes’ death the Rhodesian settlers voted to establish themselves as an independent
political entity, separate from the deceased Rhodes’ organization and separate from
South Africa. Mirroring other independence debates, Rhodesians voted against obvious
economic benefits offered to them from South Africa as the South African government
offered Rhodesia significant development as an incentive for it to form a union. The
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South African government, however, was attacked by the Rhodesian labour movement
with the Secretary of the Rhodesian Railways Workers Union saying, “General Smuts
has been held up by the Capitalistic press as a saviour of nations . . . [but] the footsteps
of the Prime Minister drip with blood. In 1913 the strike and shooting followed by the
illegal deportations of labour leaders . . . The only crime of these labour leaders was
that they struck for a living wage . . . The next was the native trouble at Port Elizabeth,
which required more shooting; then Bulhoek, which ‘victory’ was won by more shooting.
Now the Rand trouble — shooting once more . . . These are the usual tactics employed
by this great statesman to educate the working man.”18
This new Southern Rhodesia immediately codified restrictions on the property
rights of black Africans. The South Rhodesian government was deeply fixated on the
quality of Rhodesian land. Geographically, the arable land in Zimbabwe receives
different amounts of rainfall. The low rainfall areas are hard to farm, while the high
rainfall ones are extremely valuable. The Land Apportionment act of 1930 gave legal
rights to the more favorable land and a majority of all Rhodesian farmable land to white
Rhodesians. This law, along with many other Rhodesian actions was interwoven with a
state focused nationalism which grew stronger as Rhodesia developed.
What role did this nationalism play in the forming of Rhodesia and what effect did
this have on the nature of the post-colonial state? How did this history, both legal and
cultural, affect the property rights regime of the Zimbabwean nation driven by Robert
Mugabe? What combination of laws and culture were pushing at Robert Mugabe when

18
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he interfered with his state’s property rights? Answering these questions provides clarity
on the post-colonial era, which can be understood by exploring the legacy of Rhodesian
Prime Minister Ian Smith, an infamous imperialist and dark symbol for the debate about
how Zimbabwean property rights should be protected.
Ian Smith came to power in a coup as a representative of the most hardline white
nationalist element of the Rhodesian government19 and immediately broke from Britain.
The BBC article about him on the day of his claiming independence opens, “Prime
Minister Ian Smith, has illegally severed its links with the British Crown.” 20 This was a
profound moment. Britain was imperialist but proved itself committed to certain legalistic
norms or at least a certain legalistic aesthetic. By contrast, under Smith, Rhodesia
represented a bulwark against the possibility of a legally-regulated, multi-racial
democracy. He did so in rather flamboyant language proclaiming, “"There can be no
happiness in a country while the absurd situation continues to exist where people, such
as ourselves, who have ruled themselves with an impeccable record for over 40 years,
are denied what is freely granted to other countries."
The British government at the point was asked by Zimbabwean opposition
organizations ZANU and ZAPU to intervene in the Rhodesian declaration of
independence but Britain instead issued a series of sanctions. In the face of worsening
repression and seeing little hope from Britain, the liberation forces took to armed
struggle. The struggle only served to harden the resolve of hardliners like Smith. As he
said, “There can be no solution to our racial problems while African nationalists believe

19
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Dan van der Vat, “Ian Smith,” The Guardian, November 21, 2007.
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that, provided they stirred up sufficient trouble, they will be able to blackmail the British
Government into bringing about a miracle on their behalf by handing the country over to
irresponsible rule.”21
For Smith, this was a kind of “civilizational” struggle. He said at the time, “We
have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization, and Christianity; and in the
spirit of this belief we have this day assumed our sovereign independence. God bless
you all.” He associates the Rhodesian nation with civilization in the abstract. His
sentiments contain a deeply nationalist tone, one which was the logical culmination of
the fundamental, distinct, nationalist character of the Rhodesian state.
This is the third of three historical pressures pushing on what was then soon to
be Zimbabwe. Its settlers were nationalistic. Its laws were deeply oppressive and
restrictive and its politicians promoted a white nationalism which was central to the
founding of its state. These elements fueled nationalist forces like ZANU, led by Robert
Mugabe, which ultimately toppled the Rhodesian state. It also helps us understand why,
after attaining power following Zimbawean independence, he attacked settlers’ property
rights in the totalizing manner that he did.
In 1980, Robert Mugabe and his political allies underwent the messy process of
coming to a political solution with the white Rhodesian government. Assisted by the
British, they worked out a political solution. A primary question was how Mugabe’s
government would treat the white Rhodesian farmers. He had said that “none of the

21
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white exploiters would be able to keep an acre.” 22 This was an issue that the
international economy was concerned with. Ian Smith’s government had been
sanctioned by the United Nations and a massive land reform would hurt independent
Zimbabwe’s ability to export its resources. The British government convinced Mugabe to
include a crucial condition to the new Zimbabwean constitution. The Zimbabwean
government agreed to wait ten years to attempt land reform.23
Despite the agreement to hold-off on land reform, the agreement had a series of
adverse effects. Under the original constitution and waiting period the Zimbabwean
government could offer just compensation to the white farmers for their land but their
options were still limited by the initial decree. The new Zimbabwean government initially
offered a slowly paced land reform, and its GDP did not suffer. This relative stability
would prove to be an anomaly, however. The Mugabe regime remained oriented
towards an aggressive redistribution of property, despite the early gradualism with
which it approached the issue. They were fighting people they viewed as an enemy.
The war was not over politically for Robert Mugabe and many other individuals in the
Zimbabwean ruling party. Mugabe was initially conciliatory towards white settlers and
even some old elements of the Ian Smith regime. Smith even praised him when they
met in Smith’s old age. This is what must be understood about Robert Mugabe’s
character. He showed charm and even rhetorical brilliance. Ian Smith led a war against
Mugabe’s forces but when he met him after the British orchestrated peace agreement

Chris McGreal, “The Trail from Lancaster House,” The Guardian, January 15, 2002.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/16/zimbabwe.chrismcgreal
23
Ibid.
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he said, “Here's this chap, and he was speaking like a sophisticated, balanced, sensible
man. I thought: if he practises what he preaches, then it will be fine.”24
Despite Mugabe’s strength of personality, there were two questions that
Zimbabwean government had to answer, which were fundamental to the sort of post
colonial land reform that all newly independent nations faced: What sort of policy
towards landowners who benefited from racist-imperialist laws is just and what effect
would property redistribution have on their economies? The two questions are related.
Zimbabwe was barred from the uncompensated taking of property in its initial
constitution but it could buy white landowners’ land at a fair value with funds offered by
the British government.25 This constitution offered a number of forms of protection
against the taking of private property and the government did not immediately attempt a
large scale redistribution of land. In the 1980s, when Robert Mugabe was killing his
political rivals in Matabeleland, Zimbabwean wealth had not been completely destroyed
as it later was to be. In 1980,y when Robert Mugabe came to power Zimbabwean GDP
per capita stood at about $1100. In 1990, one it had grown to $1300.26
Yet, in the ten years after Mugabe came to power the land question loomed large
in Zimbabwean politics. Distribution of land was a major issue for Zimbabwe throughout
its history as a nation state. The mechanisms of governance by its white settlers were
more intrusive than in other parts of Africa, and its independence was fiercer and more
violent than in many other post-colonial countries. The colonial figures of Rhodesian
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history cut psychologically jarring symbols, and Mugabe was schooled by ware. But
Zimbabwe’s unique history gave the land reform itself its distinct characteristics which
were important to the economic well-being and property rights of its people.
When Robert Mugabe came to power in 1980 white farmers were
disproportionately responsible for Zimbabwe’s national production. “6,000 white
farmers grew 90 percent of marketed maize, the main staple; 90 percent of cotton, the
main industrial crop; and virtually all tobacco and other export crops, including wheat
coffee, tea and sugar, accounting all and all for one third of total exports. White farmers
employed about a third of the labor earning force, some 271,000 people in 1980.”27 And
the constitutional protection against land reform stood. However, 1990 was an election
year for Mugabe and in the context of land in Zimbabwe’s history, he appeared to see
the redistribution of it as an issue he could use to gain popularity. The scope of the
Zimbabwean government’s legal power grew over time. In December 1990, the
Zimbabwean parliament amended its constitution to allow the government to confiscate
land and fix the price of that they would buy it for. Four thousand white farmers met with
Agriculture Secretary Witness Mangwende in January of 1991. Magwende told them,
“The land question is a time bomb which must be solved now. The time for
energy-consuming debates on the desirability or otherwise of this programme has run
out. The only useful debate that the government is willing to entertain is about
implementation modalities.”28 “Bomb” implies a belief that something worse would
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happen if the government failed to issue some sort of land reform and the reference to
implementation modalities begets a certain understanding of practicality by
Mangwende. But in this analysis implementation and scope define the meaning of the
term “land reform.” This concept of land reform devolved further, and the Zimbabwean
constitution was further amended. The Zimbabwean constitution initially gave anyone
whose land was taken away a means of petitioning the government. Article III Section
Sixteen D of the Zimbabwean constitution stated, taking land “requires the acquiring
authority, if the acquisition is contested, to apply to the High Court or some other court
before, or not later than thirty days after, the acquisition for an order confirming the
acquisition.” This was amended out of Zimbabwe’s constitution in 1990 because the
Zimbabwean high court was very critical of Zimbabwe’s plans. Just retired Supreme
Court Justice Enoch Dumbutshena said Mugabe’s land reform “flies in the face of all
forms of modern society and the rule of law.”29 And land reform was progressing rapidly.
The scope of the control the government gave itself and the size of the disruption of
capital for farm owners increased dramatically throughout the 1990s. In 1993, Mugabe
gave a speech saying, “If white settlers took the land without paying, we can in a similar
way take the land without paying.”30 This statement is an attack on the principle of
legality. It is a justification of behavior using the actions of the white Rhodesian settlers.
But with this ideology and rhetoric, as the conception of the scope of the land reform
grew so did the corruption of those implementing it. Witness Mangwende, who
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threatened the landowners of a time bomb, was caught leasing a farm taken from a
white farmer which the government claimed was given to landless peasants.”31 This was
also at a time when Mugabe gave his inner cabinet large pay raises. “In 1995 the
cabinet awarded all Mugabe ministers and members of parliament large pay raises of
133 percent.”32 The Mugabe land reform increased the political power of the central
government but it materially benefitted them as well. They saw it as the purest political
question the country had to answer. And Zimbabwe’s economy (in terms of GDP per
capita) actually shrank as the land reform continued. In the year 2000, the GDP per
capita of Zimbabwe was slightly smaller than it was in the year 1990.33
In the first decade of the 21st century the scope of Zimbabwe’s land reform
would grow larger than it had in the last decade of the twentieth. One of its largest
issues is that it gave outsized benefits to Zimbabwe’s elite. The rhetoric around land
reform was populist but the policy often failed to benefit those who many would argue
had been most harmed by Rhodesian history. Catherine Boone writes about the top
down nature of Zimbabwe’s land efforts, the “Fast Track program was not a grassroots
initiative driven by organized constituencies of small scale farmers struggling with
problems of land access and and landlessness. Fast Track farm takeovers of
2000-2005 happened as a government initiative.”34 Land became what Zimbabwe
based its idea of international economics around. In the year 2000 Mugabe’s political
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party campaigned on the slogan: “land is the economy and the economy is land.”35 This
logic contradicts the argument for property rights. But on Mugabe’s terms the Fast Track
addition to land reform was quite successful. In 2004, more than ninety percent of white
owned land had been transferred to black farmers.36 This led to a reduction in
Zimbabwe’s economy and a reduction in Zimbabwe’s productive capabilities. In the year
2008, Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita was about half as much as it was in 2000.37 This
coincided with a massive decrease in Zimbabwean production. “The tobacco industry,
which was Zimbabwe’s single largest generator of foreign exchange and accounted for
almost a third of Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange earnings in 2000, has almost completely
collapsed. The crop that earned some US$600 million in 2000 generated less than
US$125 million in 2007.”38 The period of the accelerating land reform saw Zimbabwe fall
behind and deeply harm its attempts for successful economic development.
Zimbabwe’s government acted in its land reform to solve a situation it did not
cause and many would argue deserved government action. But all attempts to take and
redistribute physical property, in varying degrees, contradict the argument for the
economic benefits of property rights. Mugabe’s land reform was not done legalistically.
This uncertainty increased its economic issues. It was also driven by political actors who
were working to solve political concerns. The rhetoric of violence by the government
blurred the line between attack on old enemies and necessary redistribution. This
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rhetoric also protected large-scale opportunities for corruption by Zimbabwean political
elite, which were opportunities they took. These actions greatly harmed Zimbabwe’s
productive capabilities and economic output, which had deeply negative consequences
for the real wealth of its citizens. This offers much to be learned in understanding land
reform and development.

Botswana
Botswana’s development history has been markedly different from Zimbabwe’s.
It’s history in colonialism was different and less severe. The English had far less
influence in Botswana than they did in Zimbabwe. Botswana was not viewed as as an
asset for resources in the same way Zimbabwe was. It was also governed as a
protectorate of the British government not as a territory of Cecil Rhodes. This history
allowed it to incorporate some of its indigenous traditions into its modern style of
governance. It created a political culture which was markedly different from Zimbabwe’s.
This culture saw public policy and particularly a perspective on property rights that was
more open and liberal than Zimbabwe’s. Botswana’s protection of property rights is one
of the major reasons it never had a two decade period of economic regression as
Zimbabwe did after its attempted land reform. It also one of the most important reasons
why Botswana has seen dramatic GDP growth since its founding. Analyzing Botswana,
therefore, helps understand how political culture and its relationship to property rights
can be so valuable to a developing country
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The path to developing property rights protections extends far back in African
history, specifically in the relatively light colonial presence in Botswana compared to
Zimbabwe. As in Zimbabwe, Cecil Rhodes was important to the founding of the
Bechuanaland Protectorate, though he never actually gained political control of it. As
Rhodes tried to take control of the territory, Batswanna tribal leaders made a pragmatic
political decision. They embraced the British government. “The chiefs knew that only
disaster and exploitation lay ahead for territories if they fell under the control of Rhodes.
Though it was impossible for them to defeat Rhodes militarily, they were determined to
fight him any way they could. They decided to opt for the lesser of two evils: greater
control by the British rather than annexation by Rhodes.”39 They were successful and
Bechuanaland was put under the protection of Queen Victoria who’s government
proclaimed, “The Queen shall appoint an officer to reside with them. The chiefs will rule
their own people much as at present.”40 This dynamic was partially the luck of British
disinterest. It was a subtler form of colonial governance than in other parts of Africa.
Botswanan citizens were exposed to relatively less colonial violence than elsewhere
Africa, but British neglect allowed their pre-colonial African governance institutions to
develop with comparative freedom. People indigenous to Bechuanaland interacted with
British settlers but the political context to their early interactions was very different than
interactions between Africans and Europeans in much of Africa.
British missionaries were active in Bechuanaland. They were active in much of
Africa but in Bechuanaland they were to practice a sort of liberal internationalism. They
39
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wanted the British government to take a strong hand in protecting the Tswana people.
”What should be, however, emphasized is the fact that the power to which the
missionaries looked was the secular force of British imperialism. Already since the
middle of the 19th century they called upon the British government to preserve their
mission field from Boer expansion from the Transvaal.”41 The missionary rhetoric
repeatedly called for a peaceful form of British protection of the Tswana people from
other threats. This may have involved a certain self interest by the missionaries. The
English could not preach safely in German territory but the British government was
largely uninterested in control of Beuchanaland and did not deify its land the way
Rhodes did to his other conquest. At the end of 1882 the British Lord Debry even
declared: "Bechuanaland is of no value for us... for any Imperial purposes ... it is of no
consequence to us whether the Boers or Native Chiefs are in possession."42 These
competing influences played a crucial role in understanding the largely unobtrusive role
that the British government was to play in the future governance of Botswana.
The British influences in Botswana did not destroy Botswana’s institutions which
developed politically in ways similar to successful nation states. They were marked by a
period of pragmatic economic cooperation with the British. The Botswanan tribal
leadership was able to exploit British realpolitik as a force for the pragmatic protection of
their society. In direct contrast to Rhodesia, Ian Smith’s “fight for civilization” was not to
take place in Botswana.
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This was to lead to the coming of a political leader very different in temperament
than Robert Mugabe. Seretse Khama was a different sort of person than Robert
Mugabe, but the differences are more meaningful than just that of their mere individual
psychologies. Khama came to power in a society that experienced a very different
rhetorical understanding of property. This history denied Botswana’s leadership of any
rhetorical justification of a massive land reform effort. Seretse Khama is famous for his
bold marriage to the English clerk Ruth Williams, but he should also be remembered for
implementing a governmental system which borrowed from the English democracy
while conservatively allowing some pre-imperial Botswanan institutions to flourish.
Khama is also important, however, in that he was uniquely able to link Botswanan tribal
history to public policy lifted from European liberal democracy. Seretse Khama was the
grandson of Khama III, the king of the Bamangwato people. He studied at Oxford. Like
his ancestors, Seretse Khama was a notable pragmatist. And he suffered no war. There
was no individual enemy to foster trauma and concentrated antipathy.
Khama was able to unify Botswanan society partially because of his heritage.
The tribal leaders of his country were comfortable supporting a man of his background.
“The chiefs’ disempowerment was eased by Seretse Khama himself being the chief of
the country’s largest tribe.”43 Khama instituted a parliamentary democracy while keeping
Tswana democratic councils and some elements of their customary law. While doing
this, formal tribal power was taken away in a series of legislative acts. This is
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meaningful because it suggests that Botswana would be capable of acting legalistically
while seeing its institutions act in an orderly and gradualist fashion.
Botswana was not as overtly nationalistic as Zimbabwe. This created a political
culture which helped create a pragmatic form of governance. This allowed for an
allowance of foreign labor. “In 1964, four years after Botswana’s independence
expatriates filled 75% of all senior and middle management positions in public services.”
44

This is similar to other African countries which very often saw members of their former

colonialist countries remain in key roles in their emerging post-colonial nations. This
culture and history contributed to the reasons that Seretse Khama acted in as gradual a
manner as he did in his country’s early post independence period.
For example, in 1970, five years after Botswana
achieved its, independence Seretse Khama gave an address in Sweden in which he
said,
“African countries have formally stated that their guiding ideology is
socialism. This label, even if qualified by the adjective "African" can have
little meaning for the majority of our people. Furthermore socialism is an
ideology to which leaders as various as Stalin and Dubcek, Ulbricht and
Willi Brandt, Nasser and Ben Gurion, Harold Wilson and Fidel Castro have
all laid claim.”45
This is a critique of large scale redistribution as a method of reform and it is a sign of
a commitment to gradualist development.
In a similar vein, Khama discusses inequality in his country:
“Our concern to reconcile economic development with social justice poses
many such dilemmas. Botswana is justly famous for its cattle, and every
Botswanan is popularly supposed to own cattle, yet this is not the case.
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Over half the national horde is owned by men with more than fifty cattle,
and nearly, 14,000 out of a total of nearly 48,000 farmers in the tribal
areas, where 86 percent of our cattle are grazed, have no cattle. But this
does not mean that we are divided up between big ranchers and landless
peasants. The traditional system has a strong welfare element which
helps to offset the apparent economic imbalance. Thus under the mafiaa
system poorer people who suffered disproportionately during the drought
can go to someone who is better off and ask him to let them look after
some of his cattle.”46
This is an ideological rejection of the urge to act rapidly but it is also misleading
without being properly viewed through Botswana’s history. Khama’s rejection of large
state oriented redistribution of property is really an acceptance of the range of public
policy options available to him. The history of Botswana did not force it to counter a
state-oriented narrative. It could develop its institutions in ways similar to liberal
democracies partially because it was not as abused by imperialists as violently as
Zimbabwe. This is a great difference in states like Botswana and Zimbabwe.
Botswana did not have a forced need to answer. It could view its development in
terms of empirical economic growth instead of having to fulfill the needs of a
subjective social justice which was only realized through trauma. Seretse Khama was
a unique historical individual but history and the the nature of post imperial politics did
more to shape his and Robert Mugabe’s actions than perhaps anything else.
However, Botswana was also formed by its resources, which influenced the formation
of a very different style of governance than that created by the post-independence
leadership in Zimbabwe.
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This difference in governing needs helps us account for the different role the
state played in the economy in each country. Botswana has a substantial amount of
diamonds, which has been a major part of its economy since its initial independence.
“Over the past ten years, the mining sector has contributed 38.5% to GDP. Diamond
exports, Botswana’s main source of foreign exchange, averaged 75% of total annual
exports over the past ten years.”47 This is important to Botswana’s growth, but just
having mineral wealth is no guarantee of economic success. We have seen, for
instance, how Zimbabwe’s land was considered to be extremely valuable by the
Rhodesian settlers, but it has slid into poverty. Botswana, by contrast, managed its
natural wealth effectively, in part I have suggested because it experienced a political
evolution different from Zimbabwe. Botswana’s history and culture created incentives
demonstrably different than those that were given to Zimbabwe’s leadership after
independence and these Botswanan incentives were crucial to its formation as a
country.
We see this difference in the leadership of the two countries. As as important as
Seretse Khama’s governing philosophy was, he articulated an attitude which respected
the interests of the Botswanan elites. It made sense for the Botswanan political elites to
respect property rights. They had the property and they had corresponding political
power. “After independence, cattle owners were the most important economic interest
group and they were the most politically influential. The majority opinion was that
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Botswana’s government was a government of ranchers.”48 This is different than in
Zimbabwe where there was a social and political rift between the government and the
white property owners - a rift which was influenced by factors historical and outside of
economic reasoning. Robert Mugabe began his land reform in election year, when he
sought to rally popular support and also placate his political allies. Botswanan political
culture never experienced the violence that Zimbabwe’s did, and conflict and the
language of it was less meaningful. This analysis helps explain why there was never
racial and political tension in Botswana the way there was in Zimbabwe. But why was
the Botswanan political elite protected from populist economic anxiety? It had a
disproportionate amount of property. The questions to be asked are why were there not
calls for a Botswanan land reform act firstly and secondly why did Botswana’s elite not
exploit the pop]litical and economic factors which together were very beneficial to them?
These questions deserve exploration.
Botswana’s socio-economic condition can be understood by examining the
words of Seretse Khama himself. As early references Khama said, “Over half the
national horde is owned by men with more than fifty cattle, and nearly, 14,000 out of a
total of nearly 48,000 farmers in the tribal areas, where 86 percent of our cattle are but
this does not mean that we are divided up between big ranchers and landless peasants.
The traditional system has a strong welfare element which helps to offset the apparent
economic imbalance.” 49 This element of Botswana’s culture is significant. Botswana’s
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institutions were not destroyed by its relatively light colonial occupation. Botswana’s
relationship with its past, cherished by the country’s political elite, offer a cultural
safeguard and convincing counter-narrative to thoughts of mass action to reconcile
perceived economic imbalances.
Botswana’s political leadership has been competent and has lacked the
corruption exhibited in other countries. It is currently one of the least corrupt countries in
Africa and has exhibited less corruption that some parts of Europe50. This character trait
of Botswana’s governing class is partially explained by how safe from political harm it is.
“First, it is important that elites did not oppose or feel threatened by the process of
growth--they did not fear becoming political losers.” There was no need, in Botswana,
for a redistribution of land to placate political groups. They were not struggling like those
in Zimbabwe, whose political prominence was developed in a violent war with intrusive
and symbolic colonial enemy. In the logic of the earlier established argument for
property rights, overall production, as evidenced by Botswana’s high growth did not
falter. These factors led to politics and economic development promoting each other.
Botswana’s post-independence political elites have benefited from economic conditions
that they’ve had no incentive to change. As Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson put it,
“no group wanted to fight to expand its rents at the expense of ‘rocking the boat.51’ This
is notable different from other African countries such as Mugabe’s Zimbabwe where the
idea of a sort “rocking the boat” was instrumental to their conceptions of government
policies.
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The relationship between Botswana’s upper and lower classes is still
problematic. In 2015, Botswana was the third most unequal country in the world.52 This
social system was partially created by the system of economics shaped by the
decisions of Botswana’s elite economic actors. But the stability, respect for property
rights, and gradualist competence of Botswana’s governmental institutions have played
a role Botswana’s economic success. Botswana’s inequality has not prevented it from
making a massive reduction in its overall poverty. “The poverty gap eased from 11.7
percent in 2002/03 to 6.2 percent in 2009/10, indicating that consumption has improved
among the poor. Real consumption per capita rose 47.6 percent in rural areas
compared to a nationwide real consumption per capita increase of 13.3 percent during
the same period.” Botswana’s historical circumstances are unique. It had a unique
colonial history, and it was governed by a tribe of individuals with special tastes. The
incentives given to its elites contributed to poverty-reducing growth in Botswana but the
distinctions between political cultures are both subtle and deeply meaningful. However,
it holds true that Botswana’s development is important and bears a deep understanding.

Conclusion
Property rights are important to a country’s development for the simple fact that
individuals who’ve cultivated their own productive capital understand use that capital
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more productively than those who haven’t. This is why countries that, for the most part,
don’t interfere with their citizens right to own property freely typically see high levels of
economic growth. This is easy to understand in Africa. African countries which have
respected property rights have experienced relatively high levels of economic
development. African countries which haven’t have seem economic stagnation. This is
true in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Botswana, which protected property rights through its
institutions, has seen high levels of economic development and Zimbabwe, which
attempted to redistribute massive amounts of land, has seen economic stagnation and a
lack of growth. If interferences in property rights do happen, their specific nature is
fundamental to their success.
Zimbabwe and Botswana had very different experiences as English colonies.
Zimbabwe was colonized by ruthless resource driven exploiters who fought a brutal war
with the indigenous population. The Rhodesian government was an open and visible
symbol of hatred which galvanized local groups against it. The Rhodesians war against
the leaders of what would be independent Zimbabwe created a powerful narrative to
justify land reform. This land reform was rhetorically focused around resolving past
issues with a wealthy white minority. The Zimbabwean leadership and much of the
country’s violent history with that white minority pushed Robert Mugabe’s government to
attempt to do too large a reform too quickly and gave rhetorical justification to
governmental incompetence and corruption. Botswanan locals had a much less violent
relationship with its white settlers than Zimbabweans did. This allowed its
post-independence leadership to cultivate the country’s native pre-colonization
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traditions. Botswana’s government did not stress retribution against the English. It was
also greatly influenced by powerful agricultural influences which had no desire to see a
redistribution of land. In direct contrast to Zimbabwe, Botswana’s agricultural property
owners had a clear role in its political process while the white farm owners were seen by
the government as an enemy in Zimbabwe. The countries were also driven by the
characters of their two post-independence leaders. Seretse Khama was part of a
tradition of political leaders who pragmatically adapted to English imperial power while
Robert Mugabe spent much of his early years being politically oppressed by the
Rhodesian government. Both countries, like many other new nations, are products of
economics, political culture, and certain important individuals.
I argue that the narrative I explored gives credence to the policy idea that
developing countries should respect the property of individuals, and not attempt major
political redistributions of land. I’ve drawn this conclusion from two major reasons. The
first is that well utilized property such as arable land gives its largest benefit from merely
being used well. In a country with a market economy production is distributed to the
entire country which benefits its economy as a whole. I believe evidence for this can be
found in the drop in agricultural Zimbabwe experienced after its largest attempt at land
reform. Botswana refused major land redistribution, and its GDP per capita and many of
its overall standards of living have increased dramatically. I also argue that the skill of a
country’s bureaucracy is incredibly important, and it often takes many years for a
country to develop independent and competent administrators. Even if Zimbabwe’s
attempt at land reform was not inherently corrupt, its implementation of it was marred by
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the corrupt and self-serving actions of Robert Mugabe’s government. From my
research, I’ve come to the conclusion that developing countries should avoid putting the
means of production under political control because government agents are often
flawed, and increasing production by letting people use capital they’ve cultivated
efficiently is the most important necessity to any developing economy.
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